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< Bu mesaj bu kişi tarafından değiştirildi TZX7 -- 3 Eylül 2026; 8:59:41 > < Bu ileti iOS uygulamasından atıldı > |
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iPhone RAM YÖNETİMİNİN BERBAT OLMASI
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Yani meselelerden bir tanesi, oldukça kabiliyetli hardware ihtiva eden bir cihazın yeteneklerinin software aracılığıyla ve ticari saiklerle sınırlandırılmış olmasıdır.
< Bu mesaj bu kişi tarafından değiştirildi TZX7 -- 3 Eylül 2026; 8:58:52 >
< Bu ileti iOS uygulamasından atıldı > -
Androidde RAM yönetimi nasıl?
< Bu ileti iOS uygulamasından atıldı >_____________________________ -
Şu uygulama olmasa iPhone’un yüzüne bakmamda alternatifi yok. Mecburen kullanıyorum.
Samsung’da seçilenleri ram’de tutma ayarı var. iPhone’da yok. 3-4 uygulama harici arkaplanda açık tutmam zaten iPhone’da. Pek sorun olmuyor.
Aselsan 2027’de yeni telefonlarını tanıtacak bakalım onları merak ediyorum.
< Bu ileti mobil sürüm kullanılarak atıldı >_____________________________ -
mystiery_
kullanıcısına yanıt
“Samsung’da seçilenleri ram’de tutma ayarı var.”
İyiymiş, haberim yoktu.
Kestirmeleri ben de sık kullanıyorum ama benim kullandıklarım kompleks direktifler içermiyor, o sebeple kestirme uygulaması olmayan alternatifleri aramazdım.
ASELSAN Linux veya başka bir açık kaynak kodlu OS mi kullanacak?
< Bu ileti iOS uygulamasından atıldı >_____________________________ -
Aselsan’ın telefonlarında hangi işletim sistemini kullanacağıyla ilgili henüz bir bilgi yok.
Burda OnePlus 12R model telefona:
- Archlinux yüklemiş,
- Denial ile Android benzeri arayüz oluşturmuş,
- Flutter ile arayüzü ve animasyonları çizdirmiş,
- Smithay ile ekran, dokunmatik ve pencereler gibi temel işleri yönetmiş,
- Droidloom ile de Android uygulamalarını linuxta çalıştırmış.
Yani kısaca:
Android kullanmadan, Linux üzerinde Android telefon gibi çalışan bir sistem yapmış tek başına.
githubGitHub - denialwm/denial: Denial is a Flutter-native Wayland compositor that puts Flutter at the foundation of the desktop, unifying the shell, motion, and application composition into one fluid experience.https://github.com/denialwm/denial
< Bu ileti mobil sürüm kullanılarak atıldı >_____________________________
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Bu iyiymiş ama maalesef bunlar henüz deneysel işler.
Bari en azından bir iPhone modelinde bu İsrail üretimi çipler kullanılmasaydı iyi olurdu. İki-üç sene sonra elimizdeki cihaz bozulsa yeni iPhone alamayacağız gibi görünüyor bu çipler sebebiyle.
Androide geçerdim ama iosta kullandığım ve androidlerde pek iyi olmayan bir özellik sebebiyle geçemiyorum.
Ya eski model qualcomm’lu iPhone alınır ya da ABD’de satılan sıfır iPhone’lardan (İsrail çipi ihtiva etmeyen) alıp kaydedilir diye düşünüyorum.
< Bu mesaj bu kişi tarafından değiştirildi TZX7 -- 7 Eylül 2026; 17:14:32 >
< Bu ileti iOS uygulamasından atıldı > -
https://forum.donanimhaber.com/mesaj/yonlen/164026623
< Bu ileti iOS uygulamasından atıldı >_____________________________ -
mystiery_
kullanıcısına yanıt
Hocam yapay zekanın Apple’ın yeni İsrail çipleri ile ilgili aktarımını aşağıya ekleyeceğim. En önemli mesele firmware düzeyindeki opaklık gibi görünüyor.
Quick Answer
Reports on Reddit confirm that the iPhone 17e, launched in March 2026, features N1 (Wi-Fi/Bluetooth) and C1X (5G modem) chips designed by Apple's engineering teams in Israel.
While the physical silicon is manufactured in Taiwan (primarily by TSMC), not Israel, the design work occurs at Apple's Israeli R&D centers.
Boycott Movement: The inclusion of these Israeli-designed components has sparked boycott campaigns, with critics drawing parallels to the 2024 pager explosions in Lebanon and concerns over potential security backdoors or espionage tools like Pegasus.
Clarification: Many users and fact-checkers emphasize that these are Apple-designed chips (part of Apple's strategy to move away from Qualcomm/Broadcom) rather than products of Israeli companies, though the development team is based in Israel.
Other Models: While the iPhone 17e is the primary focus of these reports, some discussions note that Apple has utilized Israeli R&D for technologies like FaceID and memory design in previous models, such as the iPhone 4s.
Tags: iPhone 17e Israeli chip boycott reddit
What are the specific security concerns raised by critics?
Researched security concerns about Israeli-designed iPhone chips
Based on the search results, critics raise several distinct security concerns:
1. Hardware backdoor / kill switch
The core claim is that because Apple's C1X (5G modem) and N1 (Wi-Fi/Bluetooth) chips were designed at Apple's Haifa and Herzliya centers, Israeli engineers could have embedded a hidden intercept capability or remote kill switch.
Critics argue whoever designs the modem "holds the keys" to all connectivity.
2. The "Pager Effect" / supply-chain sabotage
The 2024 Hezbollah pager explosions in Lebanon (killing 37, injuring 3,400+) demonstrated that Israel's intelligence services can compromise hardware during the design and supply-chain phase.
Critics use this as a precedent that the same capability could be applied to consumer phones.
3. Pegasus and zero-click exploits
NSO Group's Pegasus spyware has repeatedly compromised iPhones via zero-click iMessage exploits — no user action needed.
Once installed, it grants full access to messages, photos, location, and can covertly activate the microphone and camera. Critics see the Israeli design teams as a potential vector for similar embedded exploits.
4. Documented intelligence-industry overlap
Critics point to the well-documented pipeline between Unit 8200, Mossad, and Israeli tech companies (NSO, Cellebrite), arguing that "backdoor access" is a legitimate risk analysis, not conspiracy theory, given thousands of former intelligence personnel working in key tech positions.
5. Q.ai acquisition
Apple's ~$2 billion January 2026 purchase of Tel Aviv startup Q.ai (silent-speech and facial micromovement tech) is seen by some as a step toward embedding surveillance-grade biometric capture in consumer devices.
6. Firmware opacity
Chip firmware is closed-source and opaque. As one forum investigation put it: "Technical attack vectors exist; provability is extremely difficult because hardware forensics is complex and expensive."
What's not supported by evidence:
No independent teardown or forensic report has found a backdoor, kill switch, or explosive mechanism in the C1X or N1 silicon.
No state-to-state manufacturing deal between Apple and Israel exists.
Physical fabrication remains at TSMC in Taiwan, not Israel.
Apple's own Threat Notification system actively alerts users to mercenary spyware, which critics argue would be counterproductive if Apple were simply a "tap" for one government.
Tags: Apple iPhone security concerns C1X N1 Unit 8200 Q.ai
Elaborate
Searched for details on Apple's Israeli chip security concerns
Here's a deeper breakdown of each concern, with the technical and contextual details critics lean on:
1. The "undocumented function" theory (the core technical claim)
The most specific technical fear, articulated in the InsanelyMac investigation, is not a dramatic kill switch but something subtler: if the N1 or C1X firmware contains an undocumented state — for example, a "sleep mode" that, when triggered by a specific signal, silently exfiltrates certain data to a remote server — it would be "technically hardly detectable." The reason is that chip firmware is closed-source and opaque, and the only reliable detection methods are side-channel or timing analysis, which are expensive and require physical access to the silicon.
A chip design industry worker on Reddit (r/IphoneAir) confirmed this: "OS software would be unlikely to be able to catch it, as long as the ISA behaved the same."
However, that same industry insider pushed back hard on the feasibility of a rogue engineer planting such a function: "In order to accomplish something like this, it would need to be a huge conspiracy; the design and testing process is rigorous, and involves tens or hundreds of people and massive automated testing and verification farms." The counter-counterargument is that a state-sponsored operation with long lead time (the pager attack reportedly began 10+ years prior with walkie-talkies, per a CBS 60 Minutes special) could work within those processes rather than against them.
2. The "keys to connectivity" argument
Critics emphasize that C1X (5G modem) and N1 (Wi-Fi/Bluetooth) are not peripheral chips — they are the sole gateway for all wireless communication.
As one viral analysis put it: "These chips do not just process data; they control the very core functions of the phone: internet browsing, the camera, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, and even battery life."
Whoever designs the modem "holds the keys." This is distinct from the main A19 processor (fabricated by TSMC in Taiwan) — the connectivity chips are where Israeli design input is concentrated, and they sit at the boundary between the device and the outside world.
3. The pager precedent, clarified
The 2024 Hezbollah pager/radio explosions (37 killed, 3,400+ injured) is the single most-cited precedent, but its mechanics matter. According to a CBS 60 Minutes special with former Mossad agents, the attack was not a backdoor in the chip itself — Mossad duped the Taiwanese manufacturer into authorizing a modified firmware, and the explosive payloads were physically assembled in Israel.
The operation began over a decade earlier with walkie-talkies. Critics extrapolate: if Mossad could compromise a supply chain for low-volume pagers, the same playbook could theoretically be applied to high-volume consumer devices during the design phase. Defenders note the industrial difference: consumer iPhones are built, tested, and shipped through a far more scrutinized path at volumes orders of magnitude higher.
4. Pegasus / NSO Group and the intelligence-industry pipeline
Critics point to the documented flow of personnel and technology between Unit 8200, Mossad, and commercial firms like NSO Group (Pegasus spyware) and Cellebrite (forensic extraction tools sold to governments including the FBI). A Reddit user in r/BoycottIsrael put it bluntly: "Cellebrite is an Israeli forensics company that sells their tools to private firms and most importantly governments, FBI. If there's a vulnerability in these chips, trust me an Israeli will weaponize it."
The InsanelyMac investigation frames this as a "legitimate risk analysis, not a conspiracy theory" given "thousands of former intelligence personnel working in key positions in the US tech industry."
5. Netanyahu's public remarks
Critics on Reddit (r/iphone) cite repeated public statements by Benjamin Netanyahu about Israeli power over consumer devices: "anyone with a cell phone owns a piece of Israel," and in a more recent interview, he reportedly held up a reporter's phone and said "no one is immune to being targeted." These remarks are not about the C1X specifically, but they are used as evidence of a stated strategic posture that critics see as consistent with the chip-design concern.
6. The Q.ai acquisition (~$2 billion, January 2026)
Apple's purchase of the Tel Aviv-based Q.ai is publicly described as acquiring silent-speech and facial micromovement technology for wearables and AI assistants.
Viral essays have attached Unit 8200 affiliations to the deal, but main deal reporting does not establish those links. Critics nonetheless frame it as a step toward embedding surveillance-grade biometric capture (reading speech from muscle movements, detecting facial micro-expressions) into consumer hardware, and see the timing — weeks before the iPhone 17e launch — as significant.
7. The risk-assessment summary
The InsanelyMac investigation concluded with a structured table:
Factor Assessment
Technical feasibility High — chips are complex, firmware is opaque
Historical precedents Available — Pegasus, Snowden, pager operation
Israel's capabilities World-class — Unit 8200, NSO, chip design
Motives Geopolitically plausible — Middle East conflict, Hezbollah, Iran
Provability Extremely difficult — hardware forensics is complex and expensive
Their bottom line: "The concerns raised are not a conspiracy theory, but a legitimate risk analysis" — while explicitly noting that provability is the critical gap.
No independent teardown or forensic report has found any implant, backdoor, or explosive mechanism in C1X or N1 silicon.
8. What cuts against the critics' thesis
Apple actively issues Threat Notification alerts to users worldwide about mercenary spyware — a behavior that would be counterproductive if the company were simply a passive tap for one government.
A chip design industry insider called a rogue-engineer backdoor "literally impossible" without a massive, sustained conspiracy.
The pager attack was a supply-chain compromise of a low-volume device, not a backdoor in a mass-market phone chip — the industrial analogy is weaker than it appears.
Apple has held firm against government demands for backdoors into Signal/iMessage encryption, which would be odd if it were already cooperating with one government on hardware-level access.
The honest summary from fact-checkers: design location in Israel is confirmed; fabrication in Israel is not; a state-level deal is not; a backdoor is not proven but also not disproven — and the asymmetry between "possible" and "provable" is where the debate lives.
< Bu ileti iOS uygulamasından atıldı >_____________________________
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TZX7
T
kullanıcısına yanıt
Okudum hepsini. Önemli yerlerini işaretledim. Teşekkürler. Konuya ekleyeceğim. Kapalı kaynak kodlara erişim olmadıkça veri hırsızlığının tespitinin on yıllar sürebileceği söylenmiş. O sürede de alacaklarını almış olurlar.
< Bu ileti mobil sürüm kullanılarak atıldı >_____________________________
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Bu başlık burada kalsın:
https://forum.donanimhaber.com/cebimizdeki-isgal-mobil-telefonlar-ve-dijital-egemenlik-meselesi--162805201
< Bu ileti iOS uygulamasından atıldı >_____________________________
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